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140 CHARACTERS OR LESS:
A LOOK AT MORALS CLAUSES IN ATHLETE
ENDORSEMENT AGREEMENTS
Lauren Rosenbaum*
“What kind of person celebrates death?  It’s amazing how people
can HATE a man they never even heard speak.  We’ve only heard
one side . . .  . ”1
—Rashard Mendenhall
I. INTRODUCTION
One hundred and forty characters or less can stimulate product
sales.2  One hundred and forty characters or less can garner national
attention.3  One hundred and forty characters or less can be grounds
for termination.4  Twitter and social media in general can create a dan-
gerous medium of expression for athletes.5  When an athlete is a party
* Third-year law student and Sports Law Certificate candidate at Marquette University Law
School and M.B.A. student concentrating on Sports Business at Marquette University Graduate
School of Management.  The author is also serving as the Managing Editor of the Marquette
Sports Law Review.  The author would like to thank her husband, Alex, and dogs, Kacee and
Branson, for their love and continued support.  Additionally, the author would like to thank
Daniel Clark for his advice and insight provided during the preparation of this Comment.
1. Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717, 720 (M.D.N.C. 2012) (quoting the
text of Mendenhall’s tweet).
2. The number is significant because Twitter messages are limited to 140 characters.  Scott
Simon, Inspiration in 140 Characters, Long Before Twitter, NPR (May 14, 2011, 7:52 AM), http://
www.npr.org/2011/05/14/136302111/inspiration-in-140-characters-long-before-twitter.
3. See generally Joe Reedy, Axford Talks Oscar Perfection, Francona on Facing Russell Wil-
son, FOX SPORTS ON MSN (March 3, 2014, 2:23PM), http://msn.foxsports.com/ohio/story/axford-
talks-oscar-perfection-francona-on-facing-russell-wilson-030314 (discussing John Axford’s gain
of 2,500 followers); Scott Stump, Texas Man, 65, Going for Ellen’s Retweet Record: ‘I’m Flabber-
gasted’, TODAY.COM (March 6, 2014, 8:21AM), http://www.today.com/tech/texas-man-65-going-
ellens-retweet-record-im-flabbergasted-2D79325798 (discussing how a man with five followers
has had his photograph retweeted 149,990 times).
4. See generally Ed Pilkington, Justine Sacco, PR Executive Fired over Racist Tweet,
‘Ashamed’, THEGUARDIAN.COM (Dec. 22, 2013, 6:26PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2013/dec/22/pr-exec-fired-racist-tweet-aids-africa-apology (discussing the termination of a PR
executive after she tweeted, “Going to Africa.  Hope I don’t get AIDS.  Just kidding.  I’m
white!” after boarding a plane to Africa).
5. See generally Len Berman, When Social Media Gets Athletes in Trouble, MASHABLE (Jan. 4,
2010), http://mashable.com/2010/01/04/social-media-athletes/; Erik Brady & Jorge L. Ortiz, For
Athletes, Social Media Not All Fun and Games, USA TODAY (July 31, 2013, 9:10PM), http://www
.usatoday.com/story/sports/2013/07/31/for-athletes-social-media-not-all-fun-and-games/2606829/.
129
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPS\11-1\DPS102.txt unknown Seq: 2  7-MAY-15 10:34
130 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. [Vol. 11:129
to an endorsement contract containing a morals clause, his or her so-
cial media usage may cause issues when the usage violates the clause.6
However, it is likely that an athlete-endorsee could succeed on a
breach of contract claim against the endorser for termination of the
endorsement agreement based upon the endorsee’s alleged breach of
the morals clause.7  This Comment will explore the potential grounds
for recovery in such an instance.
Social media creates a platform that allows individuals to quickly
disseminate their ideas, beliefs, and comments publicly.  These plat-
forms take the form of “blogs, social networking sites . . . , virtual
social worlds, collaborative projects, content communities, and virtual
gaming worlds.”8  One of the social networking websites is Twitter,
which allows individuals to share posts limited to 140 characters,
called Tweets, with others browsing the website or others accessing
the site through mobile device applications.9  Not only are individuals
using social networking to connect with others, but social networking
is also increasingly being used for sports marketing and
development.10
Based upon recent issues with social media, it is difficult to research
morals clauses in relation to athlete endorsement agreements because
athletes rarely take disputes over the rescission of their respective
contracts to court and minimal secondary research is available.11  This
Comment seeks to fill that research void.  Part II of this Comment
discusses what a morals clause is and its purpose in an endorsement
agreement.  Part III examines the history and evolution of the use of
morals clauses in employment contracts, particularly in the entertain-
ment and sports industries.  Part IV of this Comment discusses the
contract principles implicated in the study of morals clauses.  Part V
6. See David T. Miller, Attention to Detail Paramount When Crafting Endorsement Deals,
SPORTS BUS. DAILY GLOBAL (July 25, 2011), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/
2011/07/25/Opinion/David-Miller.aspx.
7. See e.g., Mendenhall, supra Note 1, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 717 (surviving a motion to dismiss).
8. Jamie P. Hopkins et al., Being Social: Why the NCAA has Forced Universities to Monitor
Student-Athletes’ Social Media, 13 PGH. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 5 (2013) (citing Andreas M.
Kaplan & Michael Haenlein, Users of the World, Unite! The Challenges and Opportunities of
Social Media, BUS. HORIZONS 61 (2010)).
9. Hopkins et al., supra note 8, at 7 (citing Daniel Nations, What is Twitter?, ABOUT.COM,
http://webtrends.about.com/od/socialnetworking/a/what-is-twitter.htm (last visited Oct. 10,
2012)).
10. Hopkins et al., supra note 8, at 10 (citing Keith N. Hampton et al., Social Networking Sites
and Our Lives, PEW INTERNET (June 16, 2011) http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jun/17/business/fi-
ct-myspace17).
11. Sarah D. Katz, Note, Reputations . . . A Lifetime to Build, Seconds to Destroy: Maximizing
the Mutually Protective Value of Morals Clauses in Talent Agreements, 20 CARDOZO J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 185, 195 (2011).
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examines court decisions in determining issues related to the termina-
tion of a contract for the violation of a morals clause.  Part VI contains
an analysis of a recent case, Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands, which dis-
cusses the facets of Rashard Mendenhall’s claim, as well as the court’s
reasoning in its decision to deny Hanesbrands’ motion for judgment
on the pleadings.  Finally, Part VII of this Comment provides insight
into how an athlete may prevail against an endorser in court when the
endorser terminates its agreement with the athlete, pursuant to the
contract’s morals clause.
II. WHAT IS A MORALS CLAUSE AND WHAT DOES IT DO?
A morals clause is “a provision within a contract, usually an en-
dorsement deal or an employment agreement, that enable[s] one
party to unilaterally terminate the agreement if the individual engages
in conduct that could have some sort of negative impact upon the par-
ticular company or organization.”12  The crux of these morals clauses
is moral behavior, conduct considered to be acceptable in the eyes of
society.13
Morals clauses are a form of protection afforded to the endorser
company from the athlete-endorsee’s immoral behavior.14  Endorsers
have an interest “in protecting [their] good name[s], reputation[s], and
the image of its product[s].”15  These clauses have grown in popularity
due to the maturity level of the athlete-endorsees, the importance of
the endorsers’ moral character, and the amount of money at stake.16
Additionally, morals clauses may be viewed as a deterrent, creating
incentives for athletes to act in a certain manner.17  Overall, morals
clauses are valuable because they increase “certainty and predictabil-
12. Courtney Ray, Symposium Transcript, 2008 Seton Hall University School of Law Sports &
Entertainment Symposium: From the Arena to the Streets – The Pressures Placed on Athletes,
Entertainers, and Management, 19 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 381, 482 (2009) (specifically
the section detailing Fernando Pinguelo’s presentation).
13. Fernando M. Pinguelo & Timothy D. Cendrone, Morals? Who Cares about Morals? An
Examination of Morals Clauses in Talent Contracts and What Talent Needs to Know, 19 SETON
HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 347, 352 (2009) (citing Bernard Gert, The Definition of Morality,
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., Feb. 11, 2008, http://plato.standford.edu/entries/morality-defin-
tion/).
14. Pinguelo & Cendrone, supra note 13, at 352.
15. James T. Gray, Sports Law Practice § 7.08(13)(b) (3d ed., 2012).
16. Daniel Auerbach, Morals Clauses as Corporate Protection in Athlete Endorsement Con-
tracts, 3 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2 (2005).  The large amount of money in-
volved in endorsement contracts is why endorsers include morals clauses. See also Casey Shilts et
al., Making the Pitch Player Endorsements in Professional Sports, 25 ENT. & SPORTS L. 2, 4
(2008).
17. Adam Epstein, An Exploration of Interesting Clauses in Sports, 21 J. LEGAL ASPECTS OF
SPORT 5, 23 (2011).
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ity,”18 and their ambiguity gives endorsers flexibility in terminating
agreements, while also reducing the likelihood of external interven-
tion.19  Generally, endorsers are attracted to endorsees who behave in
a manner consistent with “the ideals and ideas of society.”20
Morals clauses cover illegal drug use,21 drug dependency,22 criminal
conduct,23 and public criticism injuring the athlete or endorser’s repu-
tation or the value of the endorser.24  In general, a morals clause may
include behavior that “(a) is not ‘with due regard’ to ‘social conven-
tions and public morals and decency’; (b) ‘shocks, insults or offends’
the community; or (c) ‘reflects unfavorably’ on the person, the finan-
cier, the producer, the employer, or the distributor.”25  The language
of morals clauses determine whether the clause’s interpretation is
strict—prohibiting conduct that may bring the individual into public
disrepute or involving moral turpitude—or lenient—only allowing for
termination of the contract when the individual is arrested or con-
victed of a crime.26  The specificity of these clauses may be the subject
of negotiation between the prospective endorsee and endorser.27  Ad-
ditionally, the terminology used in the clauses is often ambiguous, al-
lowing for discretion in the interpretation of the clause.28  When
determining whether to invoke the morals clause, the endorser must
balance the cost of abandoning its relationship with the endorsee
against the damage experienced when associated with the tarnished
image of the endorsee.29
Morals clauses may be utilized when the individual did not actually
commit any acts within the confines of the clause.30  Depending on the
18. Katz, supra note 11, at 188.
19. Id. at 219–23.
20. Affidavit of Jon Franklin, J.D. at 1, Kratter v. Hackett, No. 08CV02709, 2010 WL 3810098
(D. Colo. May 20, 2010).
21. MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 526 (3d ed. 2013).
22. Id.
23. Auerbach, supra note 16, at 4, 13 (stating Nike’s morals clause is triggered by indictment
of a crime).  In general, three classes of morals clauses regarding criminal conduct are used: (1)
crimes involving moral turpitude; (2) petty crimes not involving moral turpitude; and (3) crimes
that involve moral turpitude, but moral turpitude is not an element of the crime. Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844, 851–52 (9th Cir. 1954).
24. James T. Gray, supra Note 15, at § 7.08. .
25. THOMAS D. SELZ ET AL., 2 ENTERTAINMENT LAW 3D LEGAL CONCEPTS AND BUSINESS
PRACTICES § 9:107 (2013).
26. Shilts et al., supra note 16, at 4 (citing Auerbach, supra note 16, at 7–8).
27. Auerbach, supra note 16, at 8 (citing Leigh Augustine-Schlossinger, Endorsement Con-
tracts for Professional Athletes, 32 COLO. LAW. 43 (2003)).
28. Id. at 8.
29. Id. at 14.
30. Ray, supra note 12, at 485.
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language of the clause, “false allegations” or “suspicion of miscon-
duct” may be sufficient to terminate an endorsement agreement pur-
suant to a morals clause.31  A morals clause may also be based upon
the perception of wrongdoing, rather than actual facts.32  Addition-
ally, past conduct may constitute a breach of a morals clause when the
endorsee’s behavior, unknown to the endorser at the time of con-
tracting, becomes public during the timespan of the agreement.33  In
essence, a morals clause gives endorsers the power to terminate an
agreement with the endorsee when the athlete’s behavior is detrimen-
tal to the endorser’s interests or to the value of the relationship.34
However, an endorser is not obligated to utilize its termination power
if the endorsee violates the morals clause.35  An endorser may only
publicly distance itself from the endorsee’s actions.36  In addition to
providing endorsers with the ability to terminate the agreement, a
morals clause may also call for monetary or other relief.37
Morals clauses vary between endorsers.38  For example, Reebok’s
endorsement agreements include a provision entitled “Morals,” which
reads,
31. Pinguelo & Cendrone, supra note 13, at 353; Shilts et al., supra note 16, at 4.
32. James T. Gray, supra Note 15, at § 7.08(13)(b).  This type of clause may read:,
We shall have the right to terminate this agreement upon immediate written notice in
the event our client is of the belief that artist’s actual or alleged conduct occurring or
reported subsequent to the execution of the agreement and client’s and the public’s
perception thereof create the result that a public association of an artist with our client
may be injurious to or embarrassing to our client or inconsistent with the best interests,
reputation or marketing position of the product.
Id. (emphasis added).  Another example of a broad morals clause based upon the endorser’s
belief may read, “[The endorser] shall have the right to terminate this agreement if [the en-
dorsee] becomes involved in any situation or occurrence which in the [endorser’s] reasonable
opinion, subjects either [the endorsee] or [the endorser] to ridicule, contempt or scandal.”  2-29
THE LAW OF ADVERTISING § 29.03(1)(n) n. 5 (2013) (emphasis added).
33. SELZ ET AL., supra note 25, at § 9:107.
34. Noah B. Kressler, Using the Morals Clause in Talent Agreements: A Historical, Legal, and
Practical Guide, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 235, 235 (2005).
35. Epstein, supra note 17, at 23.  Relevant considerations for the endorser in deciding
whether to terminate the agreement include “(1) the severity of the [endorsee’s] transgressions
and the company’s audience, (2) the company’s investment in the ad campaign . . ., (3) whether
other commercials or individuals are available to fill the void by terminating the [endorsee], and
(4) the likelihood of litigation brought by the athlete.” Brian R. Socolow, Armstrong’s Endorse-
ment Contracts and the “Morals Clause,” SPORTS LITIG. ALERT (Loeb & Loeb LLP, New
York, N.Y.), Nov. 2, 2012 [hereinafter Armstrong’s Endorsement].
36. Armstrong’s Endorsement, supra note 35.
37. Andrew A. Schwartz, A “Standard Clause Analysis” of the Frustration Doctrine and the
Material Adverse Change Clause, 57 UCLA L. REV. 789, 815 (2010) (citing Brian R. Socolow,
What Every Player Should Know About Morals Clauses, MOVES MAG., Aug. 2008, at 188, availa-
ble at http://www.loeb.com/articles-articles-20080903-whateveryplayershouldknowaboutmorals
clauses).
38. James T. Gray, supra Note 15, at § 7.08 (13)(a).
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[t]he commercial value of the Endorsement is impaired by Athlete’s
commission of any act or involvement in any occurrence which vio-
lates widely-held principles of public morality or decency, is a felony
or crime of moral turpitude in the jurisdiction in which it is commit-
ted, or reflects unfavorably on Athlete, Reebok or Reebok
Products.39
Additionally, the increased speed at which information is dissemi-
nated via social media may lead to more injurious conduct, creating a
greater need for morals clauses.40  However, traditional morals clauses
may be too broad to encompass an individual’s conduct on social me-
dia; therefore, some suggest adding a clause detailing acceptable social
media etiquette.41
While morals clauses are used in a variety of contracts, these clauses
can be especially valuable in endorsement agreements because these
agreements are “high-risk, high-reward.”42  An endorsement contract
is an agreement which gives the endorsee a right to compensation in
return for allowing the endorser to associate the endorsee’s value, de-
rived from his or her fame or athletic ability, with the endorsee’s prod-
uct or service in an effort to enhance the product or service’s
goodwill.43
While endorsement agreements can be an important source of an
athlete’s income,44 these agreements may also be a pivotal part of a
company’s marketing strategy.45  Consumers generally view celebrity-
endorsed products more favorably than products that are not en-
dorsed by a celebrity.46  An athlete may be chosen as an endorsee
“because the [athlete] projects an image, idea, or concept that the
company wants consumers to associate with a product.”47  Endorse-
ments allow the celebrity’s credibility to transfer to the product; how-
ever, when the celebrity’s negative attributes are imputed upon the
39. Katz, supra note 11, at 210 n. 141.
40. Pinguelo & Cendrone, supra note 13, at 367–68. See generally Porcher L. Taylor, III &
Timothy D. Cendrone, The Reverse-Morals Clause: The Unique Way to Save Talent’s Reputation
and Money in a New Era of Corporate Crimes and Scandals, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 65,
109–12 (2010).
41. Nicholas A. Persky, Rules of Endorsement: Attorneys Can Use Case Law and the FTC
Guides to Steer Celebrity Clients Toward a Safe Harbor for Endorsements Made on Social Media,
35 L.A. LAW. 35, 38 (2012).
42. Id.
43. Auerbach, supra note 16, at 1 (quoting CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18895.2(d) (West 1997
& Supp. 1998) (California state law definition)).
44. James T. Gray, supra Note 15, at § 7.01.
45. See generally James T. Gray, supra Note 15, at § 7.02.
46. Kressler, supra note 34, at 240 (citing Charles Atkin & Martin Block, Effectiveness of
Celebrity Endorsers, 23 J. ADVERTISING RES. 57, 57 (Feb./Mar. 1983)).
47. Hayes Hunt & Brian Kint, Celebrity Endorsements: Your Morals Clause Return Policy,
246(101) GC MID-ATLANTIC 5 (Nov. 21, 2012).
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endorser, its value may be reduced.48 Endorsers use morals clauses as
protection because athletes are subjected to increased scrutiny.49
Thus, endorsers add these provisions to endorsement contracts as ad-
ded protection for their own brands.50
III. THE HISTORY OF MORALS CLAUSES
Morals clauses are also common in employment contracts.  The
clauses began to emerge in the 1920’s, gaining popularity during the
McCarthy Era, known for allegations of Communism.51  In 1921, Ros-
coe “Fatty” Arbuckle—a popular comedian who signed a contract
with Paramount Pictures for three-years, worth $3 million—was
charged with rape and murder after a female was found in his bath-
room nearly dead.52  As a result of this incident, studios began adding
morals clauses to contracts with their respective talent to prevent
damage to their brand.53
During the McCarthy Era, these clauses were used to limit political
behavior rather than immoral behavior.54  The clauses used during
this time were significantly broad, allowing wide discretion in the ter-
mination of the agreements.55  Many of these clauses read, “the per-
48. Kressler, supra note 34, at 240–41 (citations omitted).  In general, factors considered in the
choice of an endorsee include “trustworthiness, values, image, reputation, and publicity risk.”
Id. at 241 (citing Alan R. Miciak & William L. Shanklin, Choosing Celebrity Endorsers, 3 MKTG.
MGMT. 50, 54 (Winter 1994)).
49. Pinguelo & Cendrone, supra note 13, at 366–368 (citations omitted).
50. Auerbach, supra note 16, at 3.
51. See generally Scott v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 240 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1957) (finding that
the discharge of a motion picture employee was justified based upon his breach of the morals
clause in his contract); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844 (9th Cir.
1954); Loew’s, Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1950) (finding that the company could termi-
nate Lardner for his conviction stemming from his refusal to testify at a Congressional hearing).
52. Ray, supra note 12, at 483 (citations omitted); Kressler, supra note 34, at 236.
53. Ray, supra note 12, at 483 (citations omitted).  In 1921, Universal Studios utilized a morals
clause that read,
The actor (actress) agrees to conduct himself (herself) with due regard to public con-
ventions and morals and agrees that he (she) will not do or commit anything tending to
degrade him (her) in society or bring him (her) into public hatred, contempt, scorn, or
ridicule, or tending to shock, insult or offend the community or outrage public morals
or decency, or tending to the prejudice of the Universal Film Manufacturing Company
or the motion picture industry.  In the event that the actor (actress) violates any term or
provision of this paragraph, then the Universal Film Manufacturing Company has the
right to cancel and annul this contract by giving five (5) days’ notice to the actor (ac-
tress) of its intention to do so.
Pinguelo & Cendrone, supra note 13, at 355 n. 30 (quoting Morality Clause for Films, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 22, 1921, at 8, available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9A0
2E0DC123EEE3ABC4A51DFBF66838A639EDE).
54. Auerbach, supra note 16, at 3.
55. Ray, supra note 12, at 485.
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son was not allowed ‘to engage in conduct with due regard to public
conventions and morals, and not act in a matter to degrade him in
society and bring him into public hatred, contempt, scorn, ridicule, or
that would tend to shock or insult or offend the community.’”56
From the 1960s to the 1980s, morals clauses were drafted to include
conduct that fell outside the bounds of society’s definition of accept-
able behavior.57  More recently, sports employers have included these
clauses in their contracts.  In Haywood v. University of Pittsburgh, the
court found that the morals clause in former Pittsburgh head football
coach Michael Haywood’s employment contract was enforceable.58
Today, essentially all endorsement contracts include some sort of
morals clause.59  In general, an employer does not have an interest in
an employee’s conduct outside the scope of his employment.60  How-
ever, endorsement agreements present a different set of circumstances
in which the endorser has an interest in the employee’s—the en-
dorsee’s—conduct.
Recent termination of endorsement agreements as a result of viola-
tions of morals clauses include: AFLAC ending its endorsement
agreement with Gilbert Gottfried after he made jokes regarding the
tsunami in Japan on Twitter;61 Jaguar terminating its agreement with
Stephanie Rice after she made a homophobic comment on Twitter;62
and Oakley and Nike severing their contracts with Oscar Pistorius af-
ter he was charged with the death of his girlfriend.63  After Tiger
Woods was involved in a car accident and allegations of infidelity sur-
faced, Accenture, AT&T, Gatorade, and Tag Heuer terminated their
endorsement agreements with him based upon the contracts’ morals
clauses.64  Additionally, Nike terminated professional football player,
56. Id. at 486.  A clause may also read, “The individual shall not conduct himself in such a
manner as to commit an offense involving moral turpitude under federal and state law or local
ordinances . . . and not conduct oneself in a way that would offend against the decency, the
scorn, the contempt of social society.” Id. at 486–87 (quoting Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.
v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844, 847–48 (9th Cir. 1954)).
57. Ray, supra note 12, at 485.
58. See generally Haywood v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 976 F. Supp. 2d 606 (W.D. Pa. 2013).
59. Ray, supra note 12, at 485 (citing Auerbach, supra note 16, at 4).
60. Id. at 489 (Rick Karcher speaking).
61. Doug Wood, Social Media and Negotiating Celebrity Endorser Morals Clauses, 27(3) ENT.
L. & FIN. NEWSLETTER 1 (2011).
62. Id. at 1.
63. Eric Kalis, Attorneys Play Crucial Role in Protecting High-Profile Clients; Bad Public Im-
age Can Cost Millions, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., May 28, 2013, at A1.
64. Paul A. Czarnota, Athlete Privacy Rights and Endorsement Contracts: An Analysis of U.S.,
U.K., and Australian Law, 11 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 460, 468 (2012) (citations omitted).  Nike
chose to continue its relationship with Woods.  John Gibeaut, Hold That Tiger: After Tiger
Woods Scandal, More Lawyers are Teeing up ‘Morals Clauses’, 96 A.B.A. 16 (Sept. 2010); Jeff
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Michael Vick’s, endorsement agreement after he pled guilty to dog
fighting charges.65  Finally, Nike, Trek Bicycle, and Easton-Bell Sports
all terminated their relationships with Lance Armstrong after his al-
leged participation in a doping ring.66  As shown by the foregoing ex-
amples, a wide range of conduct may lead to the termination of an
endorsement agreement for a violation of  morals clauses.
IV. PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW
Contract principles provide the basis for analyzing morals clauses in
endorsement agreements and determining whether those clauses are
enforceable.  In general, based upon the freedom of contract doctrine,
individuals are allowed to contract for the gain or loss of rights, such
as the restrictions on an endorsee’s conduct in an endorsement agree-
ment.67  As an initial matter, for a contract as a whole to be enforcea-
ble, there must be mutual assent between the parties.68  A plaintiff in
a breach of contract action must establish that (1) a contract exists and
the terms of the contract were agreed upon by both parties, (2) the
plaintiff performed his obligations pursuant to the contract, (3) the
defendant did not perform his obligations, and (4) the defendant’s
breach caused the plaintiff’s damages.69
Additionally, for a contract to be rescinded after a breach, the
breach must be material; if the breach is non-material, only damages
may be awarded.70  A material breach occurs when a party does not
perform a fundamental element of the contract, making it impossible
for the other party to perform his obligations or defeating the central
purpose of the agreement.71  This can be interpreted to mean that if
the athlete fails to perform a specific portion of the contract (such as
complying with the morals clause) so essential to the agreement (an
Glor et al., CBS Evening News, Saturday Edition (Dec. 12, 2009) (transcript available on
LexisAdvance).
65. Nike Terminates Endorsement Contract with Michael Vick, FOX NEWS (August 25, 2007)
(available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/08/25/nike-terminates-endorsement-contract-
with-michael-vick/).
66. Catherine Dunn, Protecting Your Brand and Image with a Well-Built Morals Clause,
CORP. COUNS. (Oct. 19, 2012).
67. Yvette Joy Liebesman, When Selling Your Personal Name Mark Extends to Selling Your
Soul, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 18 (2010) (citing Rober Braucher, Freedom of Contract and the Second
Restatement, 78 YALE L.J. 598, 599–600 (1969)).
68. See Revels v. Miss N.C. Pageant Org., Inc., 176 N.C. App. 730, 733–34 (2006).
69. O’Brien v. Ohio State Univ., 2007-Ohio-4833 ¶ 44 (Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2007) (discussing the
elements of a breach of contract claim pursuant to Ohio state law).
70. Bernsen v. Innovative Legal Mktg., LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115325, 2012 WL 3525612
(E.D. Va. June 20, 2012).
71. O’Brien, 2007-Ohio at ¶ 56.
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act bringing the athlete into public disrepute), the endorser could re-
scind the contract.72  The endorser may do this because the athlete’s
reputation makes it impossible for the endorser’s company to use the
athlete as a representative of the brand or product, which would re-
duce the value of the brand or product when used in conjunction with
the athlete’s image.73  However, when an athlete brings a claim
against an endorser for breach of contract after the attempted rescis-
sion, the athlete is alleging that, because the endorser is not allowing
him to act in his role as an endorsee, the endorser is making it impos-
sible for the athlete to perform his contractual obligations.  Therefore,
the endorser is violating the contract’s implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.  The question of whether the morals clause has been
breached is one of fact, premised upon the clause’s language and the
specific behavior that occurs.74
To determine whether a particular breach of a contract was mate-
rial, the court generally uses a five-prong test.75  The court will ex-
amine: (1) “the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of
the benefit which he reasonably expected”; (2) “the extent to which
the injured party can be adequately compensated for the part of that
benefit of which he will be deprived”; (3) “the extent to which the
party failing to perform will suffer forfeiture”; (4) “the likelihood that
the party failing to perform will cure his failure, taking account of all
the circumstances including any reasonable adequate assurances”; and
(5) “the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform
comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing.”76
Due to the broad nature of many morals clauses, endorsers may be
at risk that the court will determine the agreement is too ambiguous.
In general, ambiguous language will be interpreted in favor of the
non-drafting party.77  However, based upon legal precedent, a finding
of ambiguity is unlikely.78
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Kressler, supra note 34, at 245 (citing Loew’s, Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641, 649 (9th Cir.
1950)).
75. O’Brien, 2007-Ohio at ¶ 60 (citing Liability, 2006 Ohio 1104 ¶ 100–04).
76. Id.
77. Katz, supra note 11, at 221 (citing Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 216 F.2d
945 (9th Cir. 1954)).
78. See generally infra Part IV.
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V. THE LEGAL PRECEDENT REGARDING MORALS CLAUSES
Morals clauses are generally enforceable.79  The controversy in the
following cases arose when each individual’s respective employer ter-
minated the individual’s employment pursuant to a morals clause in
the employment contracts after each refused to testify at a Congres-
sional hearing regarding Communism in the motion picture industry.80
In Scott v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., the court found that Scott’s re-
fusal to testify in front of Congress was grounds for justifiably re-
scinding his contract.81  Because Scott breached the express morals
clause in the agreement, which required him to act with “due regard
to the public conventions and morals,” the court held that his contract
was lawfully terminated for good cause, and that his discharge was
made in good faith.82
Similarly, in Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner, the
court found for Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation, holding that
Lardner breached the express and implied conditions of his employ-
ment contract.83  The court noted that there exists an implied condi-
tion in employment contracts that requires “the employee [to]
79. See generally Nader v. ABC TV, Inc., 150 Fed. App’x. 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2005) In a breach of
contract claim for wrongful termination, Nader argued that the morals clause was “too ambigu-
ous or vague,” and that his actions did not fall within the confines of the morals clause. Id.  The
court found Nader’s arguments unpersuasive. Id.
80. Id. at 644–645.
81. Scott v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 240 F.2d 87, 91 (9th Cir. 1957).  The morals clause in
Scott’s agreement read,
[a]t all times commencing on the date hereof and continuing throughout the production
or distribution of the pictures, the producer will conduct himself with due regard to the
public conventions and morals and will not do anything which will tend to degrade him
in society or bring him into public disrepute, contempt, scorn or ridicule, or that will
tend to shock, insult or offend the community or public morals or decency or prejudice
the corporation or the motion picture industry in general; and he will not wilfully do
any act which will not wilfully his capacity fully to comply with this agreement, or which
will injure him physically or mentally.
Id. at 87–88.
82. Id. at 91.
83. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 216 F.2d at 850; Scott, 240 F.2d at 88.  Lardner’s morals
clause read,
the artist shall perform the services herein contracted for in the manner that shall be
conducive to the best interests of the producer, and of the business in which the pro-
ducer is engaged, and if the artist shall conduct himself, either while rendering such
services to the producer, or in his private life in such a manner as to commit an offense
involving moral turpitude under Federal, state or local laws or ordinances, or shall con-
duct himself in a manner that shall offend against decency, morality or shall cause him
to be held in public ridicule, scorn or contempt, or that shall cause public scandal, then,
and upon the happening of any of the events herein described, the producer may, at its
option and upon one week’s notice to the artist, terminate this contract and the em-
ployment thereby created.
Lardner, 216 F.2d at 849.
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conduct himself with such decency and propriety as not to injure the
employer in his business.”84  By refusing to testify during the Congres-
sional hearings, Lardner violated this implied condition and allowed
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation to lawfully terminate his
employment agreement.85
Similarly, in Loew’s, Inc. v. Cole, the court found that the clause
requiring the employee to “act ‘with due regard to public conven-
tions’” included the requirement that Cole obey the law, and his con-
duct’s effect on the public’s opinion of the employer.86  The court
found since a jury could find Cole guilty of contempt of Congress, he
failed to act in accordance with public convention and, by extension,
the morals clause of his employment agreement.87  This breach of the
agreement allowed Loew’s, Inc. to lawfully terminate its contract with
Cole.88
In Nader v. ABC Television, Inc., the court found that Nader’s con-
duct—which resulted in an arrest, and the subsequent media atten-
tion—violated the morals clause.89  Therefore, the termination of his
employment, through rescission of the contract, was justified.90
Under their agreement with Nader, ABC could terminate his employ-
ment for conduct that “in the opinion of ABC”, rather than actual
public opinion, was detrimental to the company.91  In response to Na-
der’s allegations that the clause was ambiguous and vague, the court
84. Id. at 850.
85. See id. at 850–51.
86. Loew’s, Inc, 185 F.2d at 649, 661–62. (finding that “the actual effect of Cole’s conduct
upon public opinion” was a material issue in the case).  Cole’s morals clause read,
[t]he employee agrees to conduct himself with due regard to public conventions and
morals, and agrees that he will not do or commit any act or thing that will tend to
degrade him in society or bring him into public hatred, contempt, scorn or ridicule, or
that will tend to shock, insult or offend the community or ridicule public morals or
decency, or prejudice the producer or the motion picture, theatrical or radio industry in
general.
Id. at 644.
87. Id. at 648.
88. See id. at 662.
89. Nader, 150 Fed. Appx. at 55.
90. Id.  Nader’s morals clause read,
[i]f, in the opinion of ABC, Artist shall commit any act or do anything which might
tend to bring Artist into public disrepute, contempt, scandal, or ridicule, or which might
tend to reflect unfavorably on ABC, any sponsor of a program, any such sponsor’s
advertising agency, any stations broadcasting or scheduled to broadcast a program, or
any licensee of ABC, or to injure the success of any use of the Series or any program,
ABC may, upon written notice to Artist, immediately terminate the Term and Artist’s
employment hereunder.
Nader v. ABC Television, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 345, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
91. Nader, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 346 (emphasis added).
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noted that morals clauses were historically considered valid and
enforceable.92
In Galaviz v. Post-Newsweek Stations, Galaviz filed suit, alleging
breach of contract when Post-Newsweek terminated her employment
as a result of a breach of the morals clause in her contract after nu-
merous altercations between Galaviz and various boyfriends.93  Spe-
cifically, Galaviz alleged two separate breach of contract theories: (1)
she had not breached the morals clause, which would have allowed for
her termination before the expiration of the employment agreement,
and (2) Post-Newsweek did not comply with the twenty-four hours
notice requirement included in the morals clause.94  Each of the alter-
cations resulted in media coverage, including Galaviz’s association
with Post-Newsweek.95  The court noted the public nature of Galaviz’s
employment was a consideration when determining the applicability
of the morals clause to her conduct.96  Galaviz, like other plaintiffs
alleging breach of contract as a result of termination in response to an
alleged violation of a morals clause, argued the clause was ambiguous,
but the court disagreed.97
In Haywood v. University of Pittsburgh, the court upheld the en-
forceability of the morals clause in its head football coach’s employ-
ment contract.98  Haywood’s employment with the University was
terminated after he was arrested for his involvement in a domestic
92. Kressler, supra note 34, at 245 (quoting Nader v. ABC Television, Inc. No. 04-5034-CV,
2005 WL 2404546, at 2 (2d Cir. Sept. 30, 2005)).
93. Galaviz v. Post-Newsweek Stations, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59603, at 2–3, 12–17 (W.D.
Tex. 2009).  The morals clause in Galaviz’s employment contract read,
[i]f at any time Employee fails to conduct . . . herself with due regard to public morals
and decency, or if Employee commits any act or becomes involved in any situation or
occurrence tending to degrade Employee in the community or which brings Employee
into public disrepute, contempt, or scandal, or which materially and adversely affects
the reputation or business interests of PNS or the standing of PNS as a broadcast licen-
see, whether or not information in regard thereto becomes public, PNS shall have the
right to terminate the Agreement on twenty-four (24) hours notice to Employee.
Id. at 10–11.
94. Id. at 24–25.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 23.
97. Galaviz, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59603, at 27.
98. See generally Haywood v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 976 F. Supp. 2d 606 (W.D. Pa. 2013).  Hay-
wood’s morals clause stated that the university could terminate the contract
if Haywood engaged in conduct ‘that is seriously prejudicial to the best interests of the
University or its intercollegiate athletics programs; that violates the University’s or De-
partment’s then-current mission; that brings the University into disrepute; or that re-
flects dishonesty, disloyalty, willful misconduct, gross negligence, moral turpitude or
refusal or unwillingness to perform his duties.’
Id. at 7–8.
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dispute.99  In his complaint, Haywood alleged breach of contract, stat-
ing that the University failed to act in good faith in deciding to termi-
nate his employment.100  The court explained that a party may be
found to have breached its duty of good faith when it unreasonably
used its contractual power of discretion.101  Under this duty, the Uni-
versity was required to act reasonably when deciding whether to ter-
minate the employment contract.102  Ultimately, the court found that
a reasonable jury could find that the University had acted in good
faith.103
In Bernsen v. Innovative Legal Marketing, LLC, the court found
that the morals clause in Bernsen’s employment agreement required
Bernsen to abstain from acting in a manner “tending to bring him into
public disrepute.”104  The court noted that the morals clause gave
Bernsen notice of the restraints put upon his actions, and was not am-
biguous.105  Ultimately, the court held that there was no evidence
showing Innovative Legal Marketing (ILM) and its clients were
harmed by Bernsen’s actions, and that ILM may not have even con-
sidered the actions to be relevant to its decisions.106  Therefore, the
court denied ILM’s motion for summary judgment regarding Bern-
sen’s breach of contract claim.107  Additionally, the court noted that,
pursuant to Virginia law, it is improper to terminate an agreement
when an immaterial breach occurs when the contract does not state an
immaterial breach allows for its termination; rather, the party harmed
by the breach is limited to recovery of damages.108  The morals clause
present in Bernsen’s agreement differed from others in that it did not
specifically state remedies available to ILM for violations of the
99. Id. at 7–8.  Specifically the university decided to end its relationship with Haywood be-
cause he “br[oke] through the barricaded door of the residence, engag[ed] physically with [the
other party], and act[ed] in a way which led to [his] arrest.” Id. at 30.
100. Id. at 39–40.
101. Id. at 47.
102. Id. at 48.
103. Id. at 67.
104. Bernsen v. Innovate Legal Mktg., LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115325, at 12 (E.D. Va.
June 20, 2012).  The morals clause in Bernsen’s agreement read, “Talent agrees to not commit
any act or do anything which may tend to bring Talent into public disrepute, contempt, scandal
or ridicule or which might tend to reflect unfavorably on the Network, their clients or on the
Talent.’” Id.
105. Bernsen, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115325, at 12, 14.
106. Id. at 24.
107. Bernsen v. Innovative Legal Mtkg., LLC, 885 F. Supp. 2d 830, 831 (E.D. Va. 2012).  The
court noted a “jury could find that the evidence of ILM’s continued payment and use of Bern-
sen’s endorsement after repeated incidents potentially violative of the morality clause in the
Agreement demonstrate[d] ILM’s intent to” continue the relationship. Id. at 834.
108. Bernsen, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115235, at 15–16 (quoting RW Power Partners, L.P. v.
Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 899 F. Supp. 1490, 1502 (E.D. Va. 1995)).
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clause.109  Therefore, since the contract did not specifically allow for
termination of the agreement as a result of a violation of the morals
clause, ILM would be limited to damages in the event of a non-mate-
rial breach.110
In Team Gordon, Inc. v. Fruit of the Loom, Inc., Team Gordon
brought a breach of contract claim against Fruit of the Loom based
upon Fruit of the Loom’s decision not to renew its sponsorship agree-
ment, Fruit of the Loom’s alleged nonpayment of fees to Team
Gordon, and Fruit of the Loom’s alleged wrongful termination of the
agreement in bad faith.111  Fruit of the Loom based its decision to
terminate the agreement on Gordon’s behavior—Gordon threw his
helmet at another person, and referred to him as “a ‘piece of shit.’”112
Gordon argued the morals clause provision should have been strictly
construed because it required Fruit of the Loom to exercise its discre-
tion.113  Fruit of the Loom argued that its agreement with Team
Gordon was terminated pursuant to the contract’s morals clause,
which allowed for termination for “‘any adverse publicity.’”114  Ulti-
mately, the court refused to grant Fruit of the Loom’s motion for sum-
mary judgment of the breach of contract claim, explaining that Team
Gordon failed to meet the reasonable expectations of performance
and conduct required for compliance with the agreement.115
Chris Webber, a former NBA player, brought a claim against Fila
for wrongful termination.  In arbitration, Webber was awarded $2.61
109. Id. at 17–18.
110. Id.
111. Team Gordon, Inc. v. Fruit of the Loom, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16917, at 12
(W.D.N.C. Feb. 19, 2009).
112. Def.’s Mem.in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 10, Team Gordon, Inc. v. Fruit of the Loom,
Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16917 (W.D.N.C. July 23, 2008).  The incident cited was not the first
instance in which Gordon participated in detrimental behavior. Id. at 11.  On a previous occa-
sion, Fruit of the Loom had warned Gordon of termination after he “retaliated against another
[NASCAR] driver.” Id.  After the current instance, Jim Beam, another sponsor, took action
against Gordon, warning of termination. Id. at 12.
113. Team Gordon, Inc.’s Trial Br. at 9, Team Gordon, Inc. v. Fruit of the Loom, Inc., 2010
WL 3055175 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 24, 2010).
114. Team Gordon, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16917, at 10; Def.’s Memo. in Supp. of Mot. for
Summ. J. at 9, Team Gordon, Inc. v. Fruit of the Loom, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16917
(emphasis in original).  The morals clause allowed for termination of the
[a]greement if Gordon ‘commits or has committed any act, or is charged with a felony,
or has been or becomes involved in any situation or occurrence involving fraud, moral
turpitude or otherwise reasonably tending to bring him into public disrepute, contempt,
scandal or ridicule, or reasonably tending to shock, insult or offend any class or group
of people, or reflecting unfavorably upon [Fruit of the Loom’s] reputation or its
products.’
Id. at 10–11.
115. Team Gordon, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16917 at 21, 27.
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million because Fila terminated his endorsement agreement after he
was fined for possession of marijuana.116  The arbitrator determined
that the language of the morals clause in the endorsement agreement
between Webber and Fila only allowed for termination “if [Webber
was] convicted of a crime”; therefore, termination was not legally jus-
tified based upon an administrative fine, demonstrating that the lan-
guage of morals clauses determine the prohibited conduct.117
Generally, in employment contracts, termination for the violation
of a morals clause is justified if an employer reasonably foresees sub-
stantial harm to the value of the employee’s performance as a result of
the employee’s behavior.118  However, in some cases, employees have
prevailed in challenging legal conduct occurring outside the scope of
employment based upon the employee’s reasonable expectation of
privacy.119  Overall, courts tend to defer to the employer “when any
business interest is at stake.”120  In general, an employee has a duty to
abstain from acting in a manner that may have detrimental effects on
the employer’s interests or the employee’s performance.121  Whether
this duty is breached is determined by taking into account the nature
of the employment and the purported acts rendering the employee
unable to perform his employment duties.122  The determination of
whether a party to a contract may terminate its relationship with the
other party based upon the other party’s violation of a morals clause is
fact intensive.  Ultimately, the specific conduct must fall within the
116. Pinguelo & Cendrone, supra note 13, at 377 (citing Prematurely Terminated – Kings’
Webber Wins Ruling Against Fila, CNN/SI, July 8, 1999, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/basket-
ball/nba/news/1999/07/08/webberfilaap/).
117. Pinguelo & Cendrone, supra note 13, at 377
118. Joseph M. Perillo & John E. Murray, Jr., Corbin on Contracts § 34.8 (2013).  In one in-
stance, a district terminated a high school teacher’s employment after she “post[ed] on her
Facebook page that she thought residents of the school district were ‘arrogant and snobby’ and
that she was ‘so not looking forward to another year [at the school].’”  Patricia Sa´nchez Abril et
al., Blurred Boundaries: Social Media Privacy and the Twenty-First Century Employee, 49 AM.
BUS. L.J. 63, 69 (2012) (citing H.S. Teacher Loses Job Over Facebook Posting, BOSTONCHANNEL
.COM (Aug. 18, 2010), http://www.thebostonchannel.com/r/2460937/detail.html).  Additionally, a
flight attendant’s employment was terminated “for posting suggestive pictures of herself in her
company uniform.” Id. (citing Compl., Simonetti v. Delta Airlines Inc., No. 1:05-cv-2321, 2005
WL 2897844 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 7, 2005)).  Finally, employees of a pizza chain “were fired after
posting a ‘prank’ video on Youtube that showed them preparing sandwiches at work while one
put cheese up his nose and mucus on the food.” Id. (citing Stephanie Clifford, Video Prank at
Domino’s Taints Brand, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2009, at B1).
119. Liebesman, supra note 67, at 62 (citing Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, What Do You Do When
You Are Not at Work?: Limiting the Use of Off-Duty Conduct as the Basis for Adverse Employ-
ment Decisions, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 625, 629–30 (2004)).
120. Abril et al., supra note 117, at 94.
121. Kressler, supra note 34, at 246 (citations omitted).
122. Id.
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contractual language of the morals clause, and the endorser must act
reasonably and in good faith when terminating the relationship.
VI. AN IN-DEPTH EXAMINATION OF MENDENHALL
V. HANESBRANDS, INC.
Fans’ criticism regarding athletes’ controversial messages on Twitter
may be grounds for the termination of an endorsement agreement by
the endorser.  In 2011, Rashard Mendenhall made comments on Twit-
ter in reaction to the death of Osama Bin Laden.123  Those comments
led to Hanesbrands’ termination of its endorsement agreement with
Mendenhall for its brand, Champion.124  However, Mendenhall ar-
gued that his endorsement agreement with Hanesbrands, “required
[him] to use social media to express his views on ‘off-the-field is-
sues.’”125  If this were true, Mendenhall complied with his obligations
pursuant to the agreement.  Further, it was likely clear that the discus-
sion of these issues would probably raise controversy among fans;
therefore, Hanesbrands should have foreseen the potential negative
implications of Mendenhall’s conduct.
The case of Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands, Inc., involved an endorse-
ment contract between Mendenhall and Hanesbrands that contained a
morals clause.126  Mendenhall did not allege that the morals clause
itself was unenforceable; rather, he alleged that the use of the clause
to terminate his agreement with Hanesbrands was unreasonable and
violated the parties’ understanding of Mendenhall’s use of Twitter to
123. Kressler, supra note 34, at 246 at 23–24 (citations omitted).
124. Mendenhall had previously made comments that may have been deemed controversial.
In the past, he had tweeted his beliefs regarding “Islam, women, parenting, and relationships,
and made comments in which [he] compared the NFL to the slave trade.” Mendenhall v. Hanes-
brands, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717, 720 (M.D.N.C. 2012).  While these statements may have been
determined to be controversial or to the detriment of the value of the Champion brand or
Hanesbrands, Hanesbrands did not terminate his endorsement agreement. Id. In terminating its
agreement, Hanesbrands wrote, “While we respect Mr. Mendenhall’s right to express sincere
thoughts regarding potentially controversial topics, we no longer believe that Mr. Mendenhall
can appropriately represent Champion and we have notified Mr. Mendenhall that we are ending
our business relationship.”  Compl. at ¶ 39, Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717
(M.D.N.C. 2012).
125. Pl.’s Memo. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for J. on the Pleadings at 1, Mendenhall v. Hanes-
brands, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717 (M.D.N.C. 2012).  The extended agreement between Menden-
hall and Hanesbrands included “a provision regarding ‘Social Media,’ contemplating that Mr.
Mendenhall would make use of certain social media to express his ‘thoughts and views regarding
his partnership with the Champion brand, playing in the NFL and off-the-field issues.”  Compl.
at P15, Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717 (M.D.N.C. 2012).
126. See generally Mendenhall, 856 F. Supp. 2d 717.
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express his opinions.127  The morals clause in Mendenhall and Hanes-
brand’s agreement read:
If Mendenhall commits or is arrested for any crime or becomes in-
volved in any situation or occurrence (collectively, the “Act”) tend-
ing to bring Mendenhall into public disrepute, contempt, scandal, or
ridicule, or tending to shock, insult or of-fend [sic] the majority of
the consuming public or any protected class or group thereof, then
we shall have the right to immediately terminate this Agreement.
[Hanesbrands, Inc.’s] decision on all matters arising under this Sec-
tion 17(a) shall be conclusive.128
Based upon the language used in the agreement—“tending to”—
Hanesbrands had broad latitude in its decision making, allowing for
immense discretion in determining whether to continue or to sever its
relationship with Mendenhall.129  Mendenhall alleged Hanesbrands’
over-encompassing interpretation of the clause was inconsistent with
the parties’ course of dealing.130  Therefore, Hanesbrands breached
the contract because, in terminating the agreement, Hanesbrands vio-
lated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.131  This im-
plied duty of good faith required Hanesbrands use its discretionary
power in a reasonable manner, with proper motive, and in a way that
was consistent with the parties’ reasonable expectations.132  In gen-
eral, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires a
party using its discretionary power—such as its power to terminate an
endorsement agreement—to not act in an arbitrary, irrational, or un-
reasonable manner.133
Mendenhall argued that in other cases involving similar morals
clauses, violent or alleged criminal behavior was used as the basis for
127. Id. at 725; see also Pl.’s Memo. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for J. on the Pleadings at 8,
Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717 (M.D.N.C. 2012).
128. Pl.’s Memo. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for J. on the Pleadings at 2, Mendenhall v. Hanes-
brands, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717 (M.D.N.C. 2012) (emphasis added); see also Joseph M. Perillo
& John E. Murray, Jr., supra Note 119, at § 34.8. .  This morals clause was not the original.  The
original clause stated that “Hanesbrands could not terminate Plaintiff unless he was ‘arrested for
and charged with, or indicted for or convicted of any felony or crime involving moral turpi-
tude.’”  Reply Memo. in Further Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for J. on the Pleadings at 3, Mendenhall v.
Hanesbrands, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717 (M.D.N.C. 2012).  Hanesbrands stated that it “specifically
bargained for the new [provision], which broadened the scope of Hanesbrands’ termination
rights to include other situations or occurrences which would potentially result in damage to
[Mendenhall’s] public image or reputation.”  Memo. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for J. on the Plead-
ings at 5, Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717 (M.D.N.C. 2012).
129. SELZ ET AL., supra note 25, at § 9:107.
130. Mendenhall, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 725.
131. Id. at 720.
132. Id. (The court noted that Hanesbrand could not “act arbitrarily, irrationally or unreason-
ably in exercising [its] discretion.”).
133. Joseph M. Perillo & John E. Murray, Jr., supra Note 119, at § 34.8 n. 32.
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terminating the agreements.134  In a public statement, Hanesbrands
stated that they “no longer believe[d] that Mr. Mendenhall [could]
appropriately represent Champion and [they had] notified Mr. Men-
denhall that [they were] ending [the] business relationship.”135  While
the morals clause required that Mendenhall be brought into public
disrepute, Mendenhall cited both negative and positive reactions to
his comments.136  This dichotomy of comments led the court to find
that the facts regarding the public’s reaction to Mendenhall’s tweets
were in dispute.137
To show Hanesbrands’ violation of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing, Mendenhall pointed to Hanesbrands’ relationship with Char-
lie Sheen, who had publicly made controversial comments regarding
the 9/11 attacks.138  Because Hanesbrands allowed Sheen to comment
on the attacks, it was unreasonable for Hanesbrands to view Menden-
hall, making similar comments, as having violated the morals
clause.139  Ultimately, Sheen’s statements regarding 9/11 were not
enough for Hanesbrands to terminate his contract; the termination of
the celebrity’s contract with Hanesbrands arose as a result of Sheen’s
criminal charges.140
Based on the above reasoning, Mendenhall may have ultimately
succeeded in his breach of contract claim against Hanesbrands for vio-
lating their duty of good faith and fair dealing.  Hanesbrands termi-
nated its relationship with Mendenhall based upon its own belief
rather than the actual belief of the public.141  In its statements, Hanes-
brands noted it disagreed with the comments Mendenhall made re-
garding the death of Osama bin Laden on Twitter.142  Conversely, the
134. Pl.’s Memo. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for J. on the Pleadings at 7, Mendenhall v. Hanes-
brands, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717 (M.D.N.C. 2012) (citing Galaviz v. Post-Newsweek Stations, 380
Fed. Appx. 457 (5th Cir. 2010); Nader v. ABC Television, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 345 (S.D.N.Y.
2004)).
135. Mendenhall, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 722.
136. Id. at 727.  While it is unclear what the term “public disrepute” meant, the court seemed
to imply that the term required an overwhelmingly negative response to the statements. Id. at
726.
137. Id.
138. Pl.’s Memo. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for J. on the Pleadings at 9, Mendenhall v. Hanes-
brands, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717 (M.D.N.C. 2012); see also David Donovan, NFL Star Wins Key
Ruling in Endorsement Suit, N.C. LAW. WEEKLY (May 4, 2012).
139. See Mendenhall, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 725.
140. See Mendenhall, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 725.
141. See generally Mendenhall, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 717. .  Arguably, if Hanesbrands intended
the agreement to be rescinded for its own disagreement rather than the public’s disagreement,
the contract may have been illusory.  Above the Law, When Celebrity Tweeting Goes Wrong and
the Resulting Lawsuit Goes (Sort of) Right, ABOVE THE LAW (Apr. 18, 2012, 9:00PM).
142. See Pl.’s Memo. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for J. on the Pleadings at 8, Mendenhall v.
Hanesbrands, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717 (M.D.N.C. 2012).
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court was unable to find sufficient evidence to show that the majority
of public comments in response to Mendenhall’s tweets were nega-
tive.143  However, what some individuals fail to recognize is that pub-
lic, not endorser, disrepute is essential.144  Therefore, because
Hanesbrands ended its relationship with Mendenhall based upon its
own disapproval of his statements,145 Hanesbrands’ termination of its
endorsement agreement with Mendenhall constituted a violation of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Based upon this
outcome, it is plausible that an athlete-endorsee could succeed on a
claim of violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing when the
endorser acts based upon its own disapproval of the athlete-en-
dorsee’s conduct, instead of the public’s view of the conduct.
VII. ATHLETES MAY PREVAIL IN AN ACTION AGAINST AN
ENDORSER FOR TERMINATION
When an athlete-endorsee’s contract with an endorser is terminated
via rescission by the endorser due to an alleged breach of the morals
clause, the athlete-endorsee may pursue a breach of contract claim
against the endorser.  To do so, the athlete-endorsee should allege that
his conduct fell outside of what the morals clause covered.146  In such
a case, the court would examine the meaning of the morals clause,
based upon its language and a determination of what it would cover,
and then the court would determine whether the endorsee’s conduct
fell within the purview of that clause.  The court would also need to
determine whether or not the breach was material.147
While morals clauses tend to be broad, depending upon the exact
language of the clause, an athlete-endorsee may be able to argue that
his conduct fell outside the confines of the provision.148  For instance,
143. Mendenhall, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 726–27.
144. Hopkins et al., supra note 8, at 24.  According to Black’s Law Dictionary, disrepute is
“‘[a] loss of reputation; dishonor.’”  Katz, supra note 11, at 213 n. 150 (quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary (9th ed. 2009)).  However, the Court of Arbitration for Sport “has defined ‘bringing a
person into disrepute’ as ‘lowering the reputation of the person in the eyes of ordinary members
of the public to a significant extent.’” Id. at 215 (quoting Nicholas D’Arcy v. Australian Olympic
Committee, CAS 2008/A/1539 (May 27, 2008), http://jurisprudence.tas-cas.org/sites/CaseLaw/
Shared%20Documents/1539.pdf).
145. Pl.’s Memo. In Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. For J. on the Pleadings at 8, Mendenhall v. Hanes-
brands, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717 (M.D.N.C. 2012).
146. See generally Nader, 150 Fed. App’x. 54 (holding that the claim that Nader’s conduct was
not within the coverage of the morals clause was meritless).
147. See Bernsen,,,2012 U.S. Dist. at 15–16 (noting that “[w]here the breach is not material
and the contract does not explicitly state that an immaterial breach will excuse future perform-
ance, termination of the contract is improper, and the injured party is limited to damages for the
breach”).
148. See generally Mendenhall, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 717.
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actual, as opposed to potential, public disrepute must occur for the
morals clause to be triggered.  Although no single or clear definition
of public disrepute exists, it may be interpreted as when an individual
loses his good reputation or is dishonored in the eyes of the public.149
A morals clause requiring a showing that public opinion regarding the
conduct is actually negative may read as, “The endorser is entitled to
terminate this agreement with the endorsee, if the endorsee acts in a
manner bringing the endorser or the endorser’s products into public
disrepute, disfavor, contempt, scandal or ridicule, or engages in con-
duct the majority of the public disfavors.”150  With this type of clause,
the endorser would need to show the public actually disagreed with or
viewed the product less favorably than it did before the endorsee’s
conduct, and that the endorsee’s conduct was the reason for the
change in opinion.
While Hanesbrands was extended broader protection pursuant to
the morals clause in its agreement with Mendenhall by using the word
“tending,” thus, allowing for the acts to not necessarily bring about the
consequences outlined in the clause, the clause also required the disre-
pute to extend from the “majority” of the public.151  This majority re-
quirement necessitated a showing of extensive disapproval, a fact
Hanesbrands would not have been able to show because of the mixed
reactions to Mendenhall’s comments.152  An additional issue with this
majority requirement is the difficulty in determining whether a major-
ity of individuals disapprove of Mendenhall’s comments, as such a
showing would require a quantitative measure of public opinion.153
While the word “tending” requires no more than an inference of dis-
repute, the actual response from the public did not imply that the ma-
jority of the public disapproved of Mendenhall’s conduct.154
Additionally, the athlete-endorsee may base his breach of contract
claim on a purported violation of the duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing.155  To determine whether this duty was breached, the court may
look at the clauses that have resulted in breaches justifying termina-
tion and clauses that have not resulted in breaches justifying termina-
tion.  The court may also look at the public’s opinion in determining
whether the athlete-endorsee’s actions brought him into public disre-
149. Katz, supra note 11, at 213 n. 150 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009)) (defin-
ing disrepute is “‘[a] loss of reputation; dishonor’”).
150. See generally Parts III–V.
151. See Mendenhall, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 726–27.
152. Id.
153. See generally id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 722.
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pute.156  The community, time, and place of the endorsee’s conduct
will determine whether his conduct “shock[s] the conscience of the
community, and affect[s] the value of the [endorsee’s] perform-
ance.”157  Determining if a morals clause has been violated pursuant
to public values is a fact-sensitive inquiry and changes over time with
fluctuating attitudes of the community.158  Adding to this difficulty is
the fact no single definition of “moral” or “moral turpitude” exists.159
To avoid issues regarding the standard by which an alleged violation
of the morals clause is measured, the endorser should specifically de-
tail the means that will be used to determine whether a violation has
occurred.160  Additionally, the agreement may provide more protec-
tion for the endorsee and endorser when it is specifically tailored to
the individual parties.161  For instance, by precisely detailing past con-
duct in which the athlete has engaged, the endorser may protect itself
from potential disrepute from similar actions that may occur in the
future.162  A morals clause between an endorsee and endorser may
detail a public statements trigger.163  This trigger could ban “acts and/
or statements to those that intend (rather than just ‘tend’) to cause
harm to [the endorser’s] interests, products, and brands,” and “specify
what medium of communication” the clause covers.164  By requiring
intention, an athlete-endorsee may be protected from misconstrued
statements or statements meant to be harmless, like those made by
Mendenhall.165  Reebok’s Endorsement Agreement includes a section
regarding “Damaging Statements,” which reads,
Athlete or any person authorized by Athlete, at any time during the
Term makes damaging or unfavorable public statements regarding
Athlete’s association with Reebok, or Reebok products, programs
or personnel, or speaks favorably of Competitors or their products
in a manner which has the effect of discrediting Reebok Products or
promoting the products of a Competitor.166
156. See generally Pl.’s Memo. In Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. For J. on the Pleadings, Mendenhall v.
Hanesbrands, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717 (M.D.N.C. 2012).
157. Joseph M. Perillo & John E. Murray, Jr., supra Note 119, at § 34.8.
158. Pinguelo & Cendrone, supra note 13, at 352.
159. Id. at 352, 375 (citing Martin J. Greenberg, College Coaching Contracts Revisited: A Prac-
tical Perspective, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 127, 215–216 (2001)).  According to Black’s Law
Dictionary, moral turpitude is “conduct that is contrary to justice, honesty, or morality.”  Katz,
supra note 11, at 207 n. 118 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009)).
160. See Auerbach, supra note 16, at 10.
161. Katz, supra note 11, at 189; see also Gibeaut, supra note 64.
162. See generally SELZ ET AL., supra note 25, at § 9:107.
163. Katz, supra note 11, at 225.
164. Id.
165. See generally Mendenhall, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 717.
166. Katz, supra note 11, at 225 n. 209.
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However, in a case like Mendenhall, this specific clause would not pro-
vide the endorser with any protection because the statements were
not made in relation to Champion.167
Additionally, a general morals clause may require an endorsee to
resign his rights to his social media accounts.168  An added social me-
dia clause may be added to the endorsement agreement as well.169  By
including this clause, the exact methods and prohibited conduct would
be detailed.  This may potentially deter the athlete-endorsee from act-
ing in a manner that is restricted by the clause and would provide
protection to the endorser.170
Finally, when terminating an endorsement agreement, endorsers
should act consistently by taking similar action concerning different
endorsees whose conduct mirrors one another.171  Conversely, an ath-
lete pursuing an action against an endorser for termination may find
effective arguments in distinctive actions taken by the endorser
against similar actions by two endorsees.  By showing these differ-
ences, the athlete-endorsee may be able to show that the endorser
acted in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner in terminating the re-
lationship, violating the contract’s implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Athletes will continue to find themselves in hot water as a result of
their statements on social media.  Therefore, athletes and their repre-
sentatives must develop a method of ensuring the athlete acts permis-
sibly when involved in an endorsement contract containing a morals
clause.  Furthermore, athlete representatives should strive to obtain a
morals clause favorable to the athlete, and explicitly detailing behav-
ior that is impermissible.
Mendenhall’s modest success in his case against Hanesbrands may
signal the availability of recourse for athlete-endorsees whose en-
167. See generally Mendenhall, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 717.
168. Taylor & Cendrone, supra note 40, at 111.  If a provision regarding social media is in-
cluded in the endorsement agreement, it should include “current [and] future, yet undiscovered
social media.” Id. at 112.  The broader the clause, the more likely endorsee’s conduct will be
covered and allow for termination.  Wood, supra note 38.  Some agencies go as far as taking over
their athlete’s Twitter accounts.  They “window dress the Twitter [page] and get [the athlete]
involved in charities” because “general managers and owners look at [the pages].”  Kalis, supra
note 63.
169. In Wake of Scandals, Marketers Should Pay Extra Attention to Morals Clauses, IMPACT
(Jan. 27, 2013).
170. See Epstein, supra note 17, at 23–24.
171. See generally Pl.’s Memo. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for J. on the Pleadings, Mendenhall v.
Hanesbrands, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717 (M.D.N.C. 2012).
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dorsement contracts are terminated based upon the endorser’s subjec-
tive disagreement with the athlete-endorsee’s conduct.  Endorsers
should take note, and ensure that termination of these agreements is
based upon public opinion when the clause requires public disrepute.
Additionally, endorsees should carefully examine the circumstances of
the termination of the relationship, taking note of any evidence denot-
ing the decision to end the contract, due to the endorser’s
disagreement.
Courts have yet to fully examine the evolution of social media and a
tech-savvy public’s impact upon the termination of endorsement
agreements stemming from alleged violations of the morals clause.
Because the endorser may bear substantial liability if the court finds
for the endorsee, it seems unlikely that a case regarding this issue will
ever fully be litigated.  However, based upon the outcome of the Men-
denhall case, it is possible an athlete could prevail in a breach of con-
tract action against an endorser that terminated its agreement with
that athlete pursuant to the contract’s morals clause.  Prior to Men-
denhall, an athlete-endorsee might not have pursued legal action, be-
lieving it to be fruitless.  However, Mendenhall ignites hope for an
athlete-endorsee wishing to pursue an action for the termination of his
endorsement agreement based upon a violation of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing or based upon the thought that his conduct fell
outside of the morals clause.  Like athletes, these endorsement agree-
ments are no longer infallible.
